Open the Archives of State Security Service Informants
As a historian who has spent many years studying the repressive system of communist Yugoslavia—prompted by the opening of informant files in Hungary and the subsequent public debate in Croatia—I feel a duty to speak out and state, without any academic circumlocution:
Victims have a right to know! Society has a right to know!
Individuals whose careers, families, and entire lives were systematically destroyed—precisely due to the devastating impact of the pervasive surveillance carried out by informants for Yugoslav intelligence services—have a right to know who denounced them, who framed them, who subjected them to repression, and who, ultimately, participated in the gravest acts, including physical liquidations. Opening these records is not merely a matter of a historian’s right to conduct research or the public’s right to information; it is, above all, a question of the dignity of the victims and their families. People who have lived for decades with the consequences of persecution have a legitimate right to learn who played a role in shaping their fate, how they did so, and what the consequences were. This right cannot be subordinated to the protection of someone’s current status, social connections, or political interests.
Society has a right to know the identities of those who leveraged their ties to the intelligence apparatus to secure personal wealth and privileged positions in democratic Croatia. Society has the right to know which individuals—among judges, professors, political analysts, human rights advocates, politicians, intelligence officers, executives, clergy, and journalists—once acted as informants for the communist regime, yet today, from positions of power, lecture us on democracy and freedom. This is, therefore, not a matter of a "witch hunt," but a clear expression of the public interest—an interest that transcends individual careers and political calculations. It represents a fundamental step toward a mature democratic society—a step already taken by numerous other European nations.
Legal Basis
Furthermore, the opening of files concerning collaborators of the former State Security Service is not merely a historical or moral issue; it is also a matter of legal obligation. Article 20, Paragraph 1 of the current Act on Archival Material and Archives (Official Gazette, Nos. 61/18, 98/19, 114/22, and 36/24) stipulates that public archival material created up to May 30, 1990, is available for use without restriction, subject only to the exceptions set forth in Article 18, Paragraph 4, and Article 19 of the Act. In doing so, the legislator has clearly established the principle of accessibility for archival material from that period, recognizing its significance for both the determination of historical facts and the exercise of citizens' rights. On the other hand, Article 15 of the Act provides for the possibility of an exception to the obligation to transfer archival material to a state archive—but only if the material is necessary for a public authority to perform its statutory duties, and provided that conditions for its proper preservation and use are ensured. Such an exemption is not decided upon by the public authority holding the material, but rather by the competent state archive. Of particular significance is Article 20, paragraph 2 of the Act, which explicitly stipulates that the personal data of individuals who held public office or were members or collaborators of the security services prior to May 30, 1990, are accessible—without the restrictions set out in paragraph 1—insofar as the data relates to the performance of such public office or service. In other words, the legislator has specifically singled out members and collaborators of the former security services and mandated the accessibility of information regarding their activities in that capacity. Consequently, the mere fact that files on collaborators contain personal or sensitive data cannot, in itself, justify keeping them permanently outside the archival system, nor can it serve as a basis for denying access to information concerning the performance of a collaborative role. On the contrary, the current Act mandates that archives be opened and made accessible. Legal provisions must be applied—not interpreted in a way that avoids confronting historical facts. Alternatively, if we hold a different view, then the law should be changed. Until then, let us remain within the bounds of legality.
Files of Informants and Operatives Are Not Housed
in the Croatian State Archives
The Croatian State Archives hold an extensive collection from the State Security Service, comprising over 2,000 archival boxes of documentation regarding the intelligence service's operations. Within this collection, there are more than 68,000 files—specifically, files on individuals who were under surveillance. Naturally, a large portion of the files on these individuals never reached the archives' shelves; furthermore, a significant number of the files that were handed over had been "sanitized" (purged) before being deposited. The issue becomes even more profound, however, when one discovers that the files of informants—as well as those of the State Security Service’s own operational staff—were never turned over to the archives at all. One might conclude from this that our society is only ostensibly confronting its past: we offer a modicum of satisfaction to the victims, while simultaneously shielding the persecutors behind the scenes. But is this the proper approach, or is it—as seems more likely—a deliberate policy of cover-up? If the only documentation deposited in the archives concerns those who were subjected to intelligence surveillance, while... If documentation regarding those who conducted the surveillance is systematically missing, this is not a technical oversight, but a structural choice. Such a choice perpetuates an asymmetry: the victim is exposed, while the persecutor remains in the shadows. This does not constitute a confrontation with the past; rather, it is a selective and controlled presentation of it. The truth is not measured by the volume of paperwork concerning victims, but by the willingness to also name those who created these victims.
To complicate matters further, no official information has ever emerged in the public sphere regarding the whereabouts of the documentation concerning informants and operational agents of the former State Security Service. Has it been destroyed, or—which would follow a certain logic—is it in the possession or under the jurisdiction of the security-intelligence apparatus of the Republic of Croatia? If it has been destroyed, what became of the microfilms, given that the system at the time routinely microfilmed its records? Is the documentation held by another institution, or was it stolen during the turmoil of the 1990 political transition—meaning it might still be sitting in private homes today? Alternatively, did a competent authority decide to classify these materials? If so, that decision should be publicly communicated and respected, in accordance with the letter of the law. However, this does not preclude the asking of questions. For what reason was the documentation classified: for the sake of national interests, or to serve the personal interests of individuals who—leveraging their ties to the intelligence apparatus—built up social, economic, and political capital within the democratic system? Minister Medved has called upon the new government in Serbia to open and hand over its archives. Fine. I support this. But since we are on the subject of state policy, perhaps it is time for the Croatian authorities to show some initiative as well. I call upon the Croatian authorities to open the archives in Zagreb—or, at the very least, to conduct a serious investigation into the whereabouts of the documentation that was once kept there. After all, while we wait for a response from Belgrade, we could address what we have—or, rather, what we ought to have. Surely we are not going to conduct state policy based on the principle that their archives must be opened, while we continue to keep ours under wraps? If we are truly insisting on the truth and on confronting the past, we ought to start by looking into our own closet.
The Relativization of Opening Archives
In an attempt to devalue this demand, arguments are sometimes raised in the public sphere suggesting that Yugoslavia was not repressive—or, at the very least, not nearly as repressive as the states of the Eastern Bloc. Although serious research refutes such interpretations—making it unnecessary to elaborate on them further—one might pose a counter-question: if the opening of files is truly irrelevant to a society’s democratic development, why have they not been opened to this day? Furthermore, if—as is frequently claimed, albeit without evidence—there was no repression in Yugoslavia, shouldn't that actually make it easier to open the files? Not only have the archives remained closed, but there is a concerted effort to obscure any attempt to gain transparent access to the reality of the past! If it is all so irrelevant, why, then, is the truth being hidden? Anyone who harbored even the slightest doubt regarding the continuity of the old structures and their influence on the democratic system should have had their illusions shattered at the time the "Lex Perković" was enacted—a law that mobilized numerous institutions to shield Josip Perković and Zdravko Mustač from extradition to Germany. Although virtually no state today would extradite its own top intelligence operatives to another country, the adoption of this law exposed the significant institutional and political resistance that emerged when it came to facilitating a judicial reckoning with the legacy of the Yugoslav secret services. In fact, it could be argued that the German judiciary has shown greater determination in prosecuting Yugoslav-era crimes—most notably the assassinations of Croatian émigrés—than have the institutions of the very state that was founded on the rejection of its communist legacy.
Furthermore, one must not shy away from addressing another issue—one that remains etched in the collective memory of the Croatian people and whose essence speaks volumes about the complexity of the events that have unfolded in Croatia. On Good Friday 2022, seven retired Croatian generals (two of whom subsequently withdrew their signatures) requested a pardon for Perković and Mustač, citing—as stated in the request—their contributions during the Homeland War and a discrepancy between German and Croatian legislation.
That event opened up a series of unpleasant questions about the attitude towards the legacy of the Yugoslav secret services, but also about the way in which certain parts of that legacy fit into the Croatian political and social reality. It is especially problematic when someone's merits in the creation and defense of the Croatian state are used as an argument for relativizing responsibility for actions in the previous system. One does not exclude the other. Participation in the creation of the Croatian state, even possible merits in the Homeland War, cannot be a reason for silence or neglect of responsibility for earlier actions, especially when it comes to political murders and liquidations of Croatian emigrants.
Opening the Archive
What the opening of the files of collaborators and operatives would mean at a specific moment is perhaps best evidenced by the example of the still unsolved murder of Bruno Bušić, who was liquidated by the secret service in 1978 in Paris. Namely, the file on the processing of Bruno Bušić never reached the archives, which cannot be a coincidence. It is quite certain that those involved in the murder hid or destroyed the file in order not to obscure their role in that way. And since we do not have the other files of the persons who participated in the organization and execution of the murder, it remains under the veil of secrecy even today. And there are countless such cases - and what is interesting, the processing files of those emigrants who died at the hands of the secret service are always missing. Opening the file, therefore, would clarify a lot of questions that society is still looking for even today, after 36 years of democracy.
An additional problem is the fact that over the years various lists of alleged collaborators of the SDS (Directorate of State Security) have appeared in public, the credibility of which has never been fully confirmed by comparison with the original archival material. Without insight into authentic files, operational documents and the context of their creation, such lists can become a means of manipulation, discrediting or dealing with individuals. A name on the list does not by itself prove the extent of cooperation, just as the absence of a name does not prove that there was no cooperation. This is precisely why it is necessary that the disposal of the original documentation and its availability be regulated institutionally, transparently and under equal conditions. Otherwise, space is opened for privileged access to information, its selective use, and even possible blackmail of persons who hold public and other responsible positions today.
A special security dimension is given to this question by the possibility that part of the documentation of the former Yugoslav services, including copies or other records, is still today outside Croatia, that is, in Belgrade. If a foreign country were to have the original or complete records of associates and operational connections, and Croatian institutions would not have adequate insight into them, there would be serious room for security risks and potential forms of pressure. In contrast to the associates of the State Security Service, the question of the former associates of KOS, who were in direct contact with Belgrade in accordance with the then organization, is particularly important. So, to what extent are we, as a state, exposed to the risks that result from the unfinished dealing with the legacy of the former services? While investing in the modernization and development of defense capabilities, we must not neglect internal security, institutional resilience and possible vulnerabilities arising from the lack of archival documentation.
Associates and Academic Approach
A significant portion of the associates of the State Security Service agreed to their recruitment under the threat of life, workplace, family or retention of passport. Some agreed to cooperate, given code names and conspiratorial assignments, without ever providing a single piece of intelligence. Some, on the other hand, were hired to cooperate with the goal of monitoring the "enemy", while admitting everything to the "enemy" and spreading false information to the secret service. It can be said that one portion of the collaborators actually became a victim of the regime. However, among them were also those collaborators who committed serious crimes. There were those whose denunciation by colleagues, friends, even family members, directly led to staged court trials, multi-year prison sentences, ruined careers and, ultimately, death. There were those whose false reports and operational constructions resulted in the liquidation of Croatian emigrants. There were also those who, in exchange for cooperation with the intelligence system, were spared prosecution for serious economic crimes, speculation, embezzlement and other crimes. The system offered them protection: silence and loyalty in exchange for impunity. Some thus avoided prison, some preserved their property, and some, after 1990, continued to build careers and influence precisely on the basis of what they once did in the shadows.
That is why it would be methodologically wrong, and historically irresponsible, to single out only the fact that someone had a code name or was registered as a collaborator, while ignoring the circumstances of his recruitment, the content and frequency of the information provided, the assessments of operatives, the results of cooperation and its potential consequences. A record category is not the same as proof of actual activity, and a formally established relationship with the service does not necessarily mean that the person actually performed tasks or caused harm to anyone through their conduct. A comprehensive analysis of such material would precisely allow distinguishing persons who were exposed to blackmail and pressure, those who formally accepted cooperation but did not engage in actual operational activity, those who deceived the secret service or provided it with worthless information, and those who consciously and actively participated in the persecution of others. Likewise, it would enable the identification of specific cases where cooperation had serious consequences for human lives, freedom, and property. Such an approach would not only be a contribution to historical science. It would also be the best protection against document manipulation, political disqualifications, and arbitrary public labeling. Instead of condemning individuals based on a single archival label, the public would gain the opportunity to understand the broader context, the real role of individuals, and the responsibility they had in the repressive system.
Therefore, it would be appropriate to grant those who were under surveillance the opportunity to learn the identities of the staff members and informants who provided information about them, provided that these identities can be established beyond a reasonable doubt through credible archival documentation. Furthermore, competent institutions should be enabled to verify whether there is evidence of collaboration with former security services by individuals who currently hold, or have previously held, significant public office. Researchers and journalists should also be granted access to archival documentation—in the interest of science, research, and the public—under equal and transparent conditions, while adhering to legal restrictions.
In Conclusion
It therefore seems entirely logical to conclude that opening the files of State Security Service collaborators and operatives would directly contribute to the democratization of society, grounded in transparency, civil society, and pluralism. It would also facilitate the necessary process of confronting the past and restoring trust in institutions. This is supported, among other things, by recent research, which indicates a direct correlation between confronting a totalitarian past and the consolidation of democracy. Countries that have opened their files are now consolidated democracies. Finally, opening these files would expose a festering sore within Croatian society: a communist-era mindset in which the "politically suitable"—often less capable—individuals are granted positions and privileges. Consequently, opening the files of State Security Service collaborators represents a fundamental step toward a democratic society. Without confronting the past—whatever that past may be—democracy remains incomplete, and trust in institutions remains fragile. This process, I reiterate, would not constitute a "witch hunt." Rather, it represents the bare minimum of decency toward the victims and toward the truth. Everything else is merely a continuation of old practices—just in a new guise.
Until we open the files of collaborators and operatives, the only people in Croatia who will remain "tolerant" are those who, under the former regime, sent people to prison for a joke or a song. In Croatia, those who—until just recently—preached socialism and Marxism will be the ones lecturing on the free market and freedom. In Croatia, the work of the media will be directed by those who—until just recently—defended the honor of the Party. Croatia will be governed by those who never wanted Croatia to exist.
The victims have a right to know! Society has a right to know!